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Abstract
In this paper we explore the trade-off between security and perfor-
mance in considering a model of a key distribution centre. The model is
specified using the Markovian process algebra PEPA and analysed numer-
ically. Three versions of the model are proposed, using different modelling
approaches and assumptions about the behaviour of the system. These
different models are shown to display the same overall behaviour, but with
some significant differences in absolute performance.
1 Introduction
One of the more intriguing areas of performance engineering to emerge over
recent years has been the study of the overhead introduced by making a system
secure. It is clear that in order to add more functionality to a system that
more execution time is required. However in the case of security, the benefit
accrued from any additional overhead is not easy to quantify and so it is very
hard for the performance engineer to argue that a particular performance target
should take precedence over a security goal. One area where alternative secure
solutions exist is in cryptography, where there may be a choice of algorithm,
or even a choice of key length, which will greatly influence the performance of
the system. For this reason cryptographic protocols are one of the few areas
of security to have received much attention from the performance community
[1, 2, 3]. To date this work has been largely limited to measurement and has
not addressed the underlying causes of delay which might be understood by
modelling or detailed code analysis.
In this paper we tackle a different, but related, problem in the area of the
performance - security trade-off, namely key exchange. Our initial inspiration
for this work has been the study of the wide mouth frog protocol by Buchholz et
al [4]. The authors used the stochastic process algebra PEPA to analyse timing
properties of the protocol. Although their motivation was to investigate timing
attacks, the models developed in [4] showed how authentication protocols can
be modelled effectively in PEPA.
The paper is organised as follows. In the next section we introduce the
system to be modelled, the key distribution centre (KDC). This is followed by
a brief overview of the Markovian process algebra PEPA. Section 4 introduces
various models of the KDC, followed by some numerical results in Section 5 and
some conclusions and areas of further work.
2 Key Distribution Centre
We now describe the specific problem we seek to model. This is the secure
exchange of secret keys (also known as symmetric keys) using a trusted third
party known as a key distribution centre (KDC). The protocol is illustrated
below, following the description in [5].
Figure 1: Key Distribution Scenario.
• Alice and KDC share a key KA
• Bob and KDC share a key KB
1. Alice sends request to KDC with nonce N1
2. E{KA} [KS |request|N1|E {KB} [KS |IDA]]
- KS is a session key for Alice and Bob to use.
- Alice can’t decrypt the part encode with Bob’s key, she can only send
it on.
3. E{KB} [KS |IDA]
4. E{KS} [N2]
5. E{KS} [f(N2)]
Where,
• N1 and N2 are nonces (random items of data),
• IDA is a unique identifier for Alice,
• EKA[X] denotes that the data X is encrypted using the key KA, and
• f(N2) denotes a predefined function applied to the nonce N2, signifying
that Alice has read the encrypted message sent by Bob.
The key features of this protocol are that only Alice can read the message
sent by the KDC (2) as only Alice and the KDC know the key KA. Included in
this message is another message further encrypted with KB , the key shared by
Bob and the KDC. Alice cannot read this message, but instead forwards it to
Bob (3). This message tells Bob that Alice is genuine and informs Bob of the
session key; only Bob can read this message. Alice and Bob now both know the
session key KS and the remainder of the protocol ensures that Bob trusts Alice
and the session key.
3 PEPA
A formal presentation of PEPA is given in [6], in this section a brief informal
summary is presented. PEPA, being a Markovian Process Algebra, only sup-
ports actions that occur with rates that are negative exponentially distributed.
Specifications written in PEPA represent Markov processes and can be mapped
to a continuous time Markov chain (CTMC). Systems are specified in PEPA in
terms of activities and components. An activity (α,r) is described by the type of
the activity, α, and the rate of the associated negative exponential distribution,
r. This rate may be any positive real number, or given as unspecified using the
symbol >.
The syntax for describing components is given as:
P ::= (α, r).P | P +Q | P/L | P BCL Q | A
The component (α,r).P performs the activity of type a at rate r and then
behaves like P. The component P+Q behaves either like P or like Q, the resultant
behaviour being given by the first activity to complete.
The component P/L behaves exactly like P except that the activities in the
set L are concealed, their type is not visible and instead appears as the unknown
type τ .
Concurrent components can be synchronised, PBCL Q, such that activities in
the cooperation set L involve the participation of both components. In PEPA
the shared activity occurs at the slowest of the rates of the participants and if
a rate is unspecified in a component, the component is passive with respect to
that activities of that type. A def= P gives the constant A the behaviour of the
component P.
In this paper we consider only models which are cyclic, that is, every deriva-
tive of components P and Q are reachable in the model description PBCL Q.
Necessary conditions for a cyclic model may be defined on the component and
model definitions without recourse to the entire state space of the model.
4 The Models
This scheme can be easily modelled in PEPA [6] as follows.
KDC
def= (request,>).(response, rp).KDC;
Alice
def= (request, rq).(response,>).Alice1;
Alice1 def= (sendBob, rB).(sendAlice,>).(confirm, rc).Alice2;
Alice2 def= (usekey, ru).Alice;
Bob
def= (sendBob,>).(sendAlice, rA).(confirm,>).Bob1;
Bob1 def= (usekey,>).Bob;
System
def= KDC BCL AliceBCK Bob
where L = {request, reponse},K = {sendBob, sendAlice, confirm, usekey}.
In this model, Alice’s behaviour is separated into getting a session key (Al-
ice), authentication with Bob (Alice1) and using the session key (Alice2). Sim-
ilarly Bob’s behaviour is separated into the key exchange and authentication
with Alice (Bob) and the use of the session key (Bob1).
According to Stallings [5]:“The more frequently session keys are exchanged,
the more secure they are, because the opponent has less ciphertext to work with
for any given session key. On the other hand, the distribution of session keys
delays the start of any exchange and places a burden on network capacity. A
security manager must try to balance these competing considerations in deter-
mining the lifetime of a particular session key.” In brief, this means there is a
trade-off to be achieved between performance and security in the handling of
session keys. In our model (above), this would be represented by varying the
values of ru and rq. If these values are high then keys are being refreshed more
regularly, putting more demand on the KDC and the network.
In this paper we are primarily interested in studying the performance of
the KDC, rather than the network. To do this we have developed three ap-
proaches to modelling multiple clients requesting session keys from the KDC.
These approaches all model the same protocol and are notionally equivalent at
the syntactic level (they have a form of bisimilarity). However, they are not iso-
morphic and hence can give different values for important performance metrics.
In the full paper we will present and discuss the three approaches developed for
modelling the KDC and present some numerical results to illustrate how the
modelling assumptions affect the performance analysis.
There are three approaches that we have developed to model this secure key
distribution scenario for multiple clients. First, we consider Alice and Bob as
a pair of clients, and repeated this pair in the model to communicate with key
distribution centre (KDC) to specify multiple clients, as illustrated in Figure 2.
In this model, a response from the KDC must succeed the request behaviour of
each corresponding Alice, and precede any other interaction.
PEPA model can be modelled as follows:
KDC
def= (request,>).(response, rp).KDC;
Alice
def= (request, rq).(response,>).(sendBob, rB).
Figure 2: Initial model of key distribution centre.
(sendAlice,>).(confirm, rc).(usekey, ru).Alice;
Bob
def= (sendBob,>).(sendAlice, rA).(confirm,>).(usekey,>).Bob;
System
def= KDC BCL ((AliceBCK Bob)|| · · · ||(AliceBCK Bob))
where L = {request, reponse},K = {sendBob, sendAlice, confirm, usekey}.
The second model has been approached in a different way. In this approach,
multiple clients were manually added by different names and parallel request
and response are allowed here, that means KDC can receive (and queue) several
request before responding to them, as shown in Figure 3.
Figure 3: Alternative model of key distribution centre.
This approach can be modelled in PEPA like this: (φ in this model means
number of pair of clients)
KDC
def= (requestA,>).KDC1
+ (requestC,>).KDC2
+ · · ·
+ (request(A+ 2φ− 2),>).KDCφ;
KDC1 def= (responseA, rp).KDC + (requestC,>).KDC(φ+ 1)
+ (requestE,>).KDC(φ+ 2)
+ · · ·
+ (request(A+ 2φ− 2),>).KDC(φ+ φ− 1);
· · ·
A
def= (requestA, rq).(responseA,>).(sendB, rB).(sendA,>).
(confirmA, rc).(usekeyA, ru).A;
B
def= (sendB,>).(sendA, rA).(confirmA,>).(usekeyA,>).B;
· · ·
A+ 2φ− 2 def= (request(A+ 2φ− 2), rq).(response(A+ 2φ− 2),>).
(send(A+ 2φ− 1), r(A+ 2φ− 1)).(send(A+ 2φ− 2),>).
(confirm, rc).(usekey, ru).(A+ 2φ− 2);
A+ 2φ− 1 def= (send(A+ 2φ− 1),>).(send(A+ 2φ− 2), r(A+ 2φ− 2)).
(confirm,>).(usekey,>).(A+ 2φ− 1);
System
def= KDC BCL ((ABCK B)|| · · · ||((A+ 2φ− 2)BCZ (A+ 2φ− 1)))
where L = {requestA, reponseA, · · · , request(A+2φ−2), reponse(A+2φ−2)},
K = {sendB, sendA, confirmA, usekeyA}, Z = {send(A + 2φ − 1), send(A +
2φ− 2), confirm(φ− 1), usekey(φ− 1)}.
The third approach uses the same infrastructure as model one (Figure 2).
The two main differences are: model three makes requests and responses in
parallel, so KDC can hold several requests in a queue, as in model two; and
an anonymous response mechanism was introduced here, that means KDC does
not distinguish between requests.
PEPA model for third approach as follows: (φ in this model means number
of pair of clients)
KDC
def= (request,>).KDC1;
KDC1 def= (rsponse, rp).KDC + (request.>).KDC2;
KDC2 def= (response, rp).KDC1 + (request,>).KDC3;
KDC3 def= (response, rp).KDC2 + (request,>).KDC4;
· · ·
KDCφ
def= (response, rp).KDC(φ− 1);
Alice
def= (request, rq).(response,>).(sendBob, rB).(sendAlice,>).
(confirm, rc).(usekey, ru).Alice;
Bob
def= (sendBob,>).(sendAlice, rA).(confirm,>).(usekey,>).Bob;
System
def= KDC BCL ((AliceBCK Bob)|| · · · ||(AliceBCK Bob))
where L = {request, reponse},K = {sendBob, sendAlice, confirm, usekey}.
5 Numerical results
The three models of key distribution are now compared numerically using the
PEPA Workbench [7]. In all cases the parameters are set to 1.0(except ru=1.1
for numerical computation reasons) and other parameters are varied as shown.
5.1 Utilisation of KDC
Three experiments have been set up for each model to test the utilisation of the
KDC, i.e. the state of the KDC holding at least one request. First, we increased
number of clients to the limit of the PEPA Workbench. Then we varied the rate
of usekey (ru) in case of three pair of clients in second experiment. Finally, rate
of request (rq) has been varied in case of three pair of clients for testing.
In the first experiment, there is a “run out of memory java heap space” occur
when the pair of clients were added to six. Therefore, five data was acquired for
each model in first trial. Figure 4 shows the KDC utilisation as the number of
client pairs is increased. We see that for all three models, utilisation increased
when adding more clients to the model as expected. The reason is clearly that
as more clients are involved, more requests will be made. Thus, the KDC has
more work to do.
The second feature that we found from the chart is that the utilisation of
the KDC in model 1 increased slower and smaller in any point (except the
Figure 4: Utilisation of the KDC varied with number of client pairs.
start) than which in model 2 and model 3. In the case of one pair of clients,
the three models gave exactly the same result we would expect. In model 1,
the response of KDC must succeed to request behaviour of each corresponding
Alice. As such, the KDC cannot hold multiple requests at the same time. Thus,
subsequent requests are blocked until the KDC is idle when the request can
be made. In the case of models 2 and 3, requests are queued so that once
one request has been processed, another service may begin immediately. Thus,
model 1 is clearly less efficient.
Another aspect shown in Figure 4 is that model 2 and model 3 have exactly
the result. The only difference between model 2 and model 3 is in distinguishing
which client pair are being responded to. In model 3 the KDC component
merely keeps track of the number of waiting clients, whereas in model 2 each
client is distinguished by name and action. This means that more information
is potentially available in model 2, although in practice this does not change
the amount of work the KDC has to undertake, so the utilisation is the same in
each case.
Figure 5 shows the result of the second experiment.
For the reason discussed above, model 2 and model 3 have the same result
in this experiment as well. Utilisation of KDC in model 1 is again smaller
than in model 2 and model 3 in any same rate of key use. There are some
new features here in experiment two: first, utilisation of KDC increases when
ru is increased; second, utilisation of KDC in all models increased more slowly
as ru gets larger; finally, they almost keep the same increasing rate. For the
first feature, the reason is that increasing ru leads to clients sending requests to
the KDC more frequently. Therefore, KDC has more requests to process. The
profile of the plots is a direct result of the variation of ru, which is the reciprocal
Figure 5: KDC utilisation varied with rate of use of the key.
Figure 6: Utilisation varied against the rate of request.
of the duration of the key use. When ru is small, a small increase has a large
effect (a large decrease in duration), however obviously the same increase has a
much smaller effect when ru is large (duration is very short, and the decrease
is minimal).
Finally, we come to the third experiment that results were showed in Figure
6. We again found two features are the same as discussed in experiments one and
two, namely, that model 2 and model 3 have the same result in this experiment,
and the utilisation of the KDC in model 1 is smaller than in model 2 and model
3 for any given rate of request. The differences from other experimental results
are that utilisation of the KDC increased when rq increases. Clearly, the faster
the clients request, more like that the KDC is busy. Another characteristic of
this chart is that utilisation of the KDC in all models increased more slowly
when rq getting larger. The reason is like changing ru in experiment two. The
time for a client pair to cycle through their states is given as Tk + 1rq +
1
ru ,
thus increasing of rq makes 1rq smaller every time, although the increasing part
is getting smaller every time as well. Finally, we found that utilisation of the
KDC in model 1 is getting close to that in model 2 and model 3. With rq
increasing, the time that the KDC has to wait between requests in model 1 is
getting smaller, and makes model 1 closer to model 2 and model 3 where there
is no such waiting as the requests are queued. Clearly as ru → ∞ the different
calculations of utilisation will converge.
5.2 Response time
As well as utility of the key distribution centre, we would also wish to measure
the performance perceived by the user. To do this we calculated the average
response time, which we defined as the time from when the previous session key
has finished being used, to the time when the new session key is started to be
used. The average response time, W, is calculated as follows:
W =
1− puse
puseruse
Where puse is the steady state probability that a given key is being used by a
given communicating pair. Because all the models are symmetric with respect to
communicating pairs, it does not matter which component we chose to measure
to find puse. The reason we define response time in this way, and not as more
conventionally to be just the time taken by the server, is that model 1 includes
blocking of requests when busy. This is a clear performance difference between
model 1 and the other two approaches and therefore needs to be incorporated
in the metric to get a consistent comparison.
We did exactly the same three experiments as above, and calculated average
response time by the pre-defined formula. Figure 7 shows the response time
varied as number of clients pair is increased.
Again, we found model 2 and model 3 have exactly the same results and
all three models become the same in case of one pair of client, as the same
reason that has been discussed in utilization part. Here, for all three models,
response time increased when adding more clients to the system. It is clear that
more clients involved in, the system takes more time to response in average.
Consequently, the average response time is increased. Another feature is that
average response time in model 1 is larger than in model 2 and model 3 in any
case of same pair of clients (except start). There are two part involved in our
defined response time: request time and service time. All models have the same
Figure 7: Response time varied with number of client pairs.
request time in this experiment. But, for model 2 and model 3, system need
less time to process all jobs as requests queued in KDC rather than consequent
requests is blocked until the previous one has finished being processed in model
1. Therefore, model 1 has less efficient results.
Figure 8 shows the results of varying the rate of usekey (ru) in case of three
pair of clients.
Except the same features that model 2 and model 3 have the same results
and average response time in model 1 is larger than which in model 2 and
model 3 in any same usekey rate as the same reason as above, we still found
some new features here: first, response time getting larger with rate of usekey
is increased; then, average response time in all models increased more slowly
as ru gets larger; finally, all three models almost keep the same increasing rate.
Two parts involved in our defined response time: request time and service time.
Request time is stable in this experiment. Increasing rate of usekey leads to
request to KDC more frequently, that increase waiting time in average. Thus,
increasing of average service time is the reason for average response time getting
larger here. For the second feature, the average waiting time for one in n requests
is that n−1nrs (rs is service rate of KDC), which equal to
1
rs
− 1nrs . Increasing
part is getting smaller when more requests waiting. That explained the second
feature. There is no changing influence fundamental differences among these
three models, the results keep almost the same increasing rate consequently.
The results of last experiment were showed in Figure 9.
Still same features are the same as before, Model 2 and model 3 have the
same results and average response time in model 1 is larger than which in model
2 and model 3 in any same rate of request. Except these two features, model
1 is closer to model 2 and model 3 also has been discussed in utilisation part.
Figure 8: Response time varied with rate of use of the key.
Figure 9: Response time varied against the rate of request.
The difference here is that average response time for all three models decreased
when rq increases. Again, request time and service time are the two parts may
influence response time. Request time ( 1rq ) decreasing here take more effects
rather than increasing of service time, for that which influence the average
response time decreasing. Another characteristic of these curves is that average
response time in all models decreased more slowly when rq getting larger.
6 Conclusion and further work
In this paper we have shown how a key distribution centre can be modelled
and analysed using the Markovian process algebra PEPA. The results from the
numerical analysis are not unexpected, but it is interesting that a significant
difference is obtained if slight changes are made to the underlying assumptions
in the model.
This study is the first step into looking at performance modelling of a range
of authentication mechanisms using PEPA and ultimately simulation. Such a
study will provide a greater understanding in the overhead inherent in these
mechanisms and may possibly identify some means by which accepted mecha-
nisms can be improved.
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